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Abstract 
 
Governments world-wide have attempted to use market mechanisms and privatisation to 
increase the quality and/or reduce the cost of healthcare.
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 England’s Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 is an attempt to promote privatisation through marketisation in the National Health 
Service (NHS). While the health policy literature tends to assume that privatisation follows 
from private-sector entry points, we argue that this is more likely if firms expect to make a 
profit. This paper examines the link between privatisation and marketisation in England 
drawing on 32 semi-structured interviews with private-sector and public-sector respondents, 
campaigners, and other experts conducted 6-10 months after the implementation of the 2012 
Act. 
 
By generating a theoretical framework on the conditions of profitability we seek a better 
understanding of the conditions under which marketisation leads to privatisation. We find 
that significant barriers to profit-making remain after the reforms, including a top-down 
squeeze on prices, uncertainty in market rules, state dominance of funding and provision, and 
failures to depoliticise the market. These factors restrict private-sector involvement by 
frustrating profit-making. Where profits are made they are through reduced unit costs and 
high volumes by a longstanding incumbent in a particular market segment. This, however, 
restricts marketisation by reinforcing entry barriers.  
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Market mechanisms have become general-purpose tools for public policy, and health services 
are no exception. With the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (referred to here as ‘the Act’) the 
UK Government sought both to marketise (i.e. increase price-based competition between 
providers) and privatise (i.e. increase provision carried out by non-government providers). 
While the Act’s supporters argue that competition will provide innovation, better 
management, and improved quality (Le Grand, 2013), its critics argue that it will exacerbate 
health inequalities (Hunter, 2013) and service rationing (Lister, 2012), end comprehensive 
public-sector health service provision (Pollock and Price, 2011), and worsen democratic 
accountability (Davies, 2013). Peedell (2011) shows that the Act’s objectives fit most 
commonly accepted definitions of privatisation, and Moody goes as far as to say that, in the 
future, “there will be no fully state-owned providers” (2011: 428-429).  
It is unclear, however, whether the Act will deliver on these hopes and fears. Despite 
a decades-long marketisation process, the state remains dominant, both as funder and as 
provider, with private-sector involvement in the NHS estimated at around 19% for provision 
including general practitioners (GPs) (Klein, 2005) or 12.3% of government secondary care 
expenditure (Arora et al., 2013). While Germany has privatised by selling entire hospitals to 
profit-making firms (Anonymous, 2013a), the UK has contracted out particular services to 
private providers. Limits to privatisation include state dominance in funding (Moody, 2011), 
economies of scale in public-sector provision (Davies, 2013), the conservatism of public 
management (Radnor, Holweg and Waring, 2012), and centralisation in contracting 
(Petsoulas et al., 2011). The private sector shares this scepticism: in a 2012 survey of private 
healthcare professionals, only 20% expected increased competition (Nabarro and 
HealthInvestor, 2013). This uncertainty about the NHS reflects broader uncertainty 
concerning the conditions under which marketisation translates into privatisation.  
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This paper explores the relationship between marketisation and privatisation drawing 
on 32 qualitative interviews with private-sector consultants and business-development 
professionals, commissioners of services, trade unionists, and other experts and campaigners. 
The private sector, we argue, is more likely to invest and expand in a market structure where 
it expects profits. We focus on six conditions of profitability hardly affected by the Act. Four 
barriers include (1) the top-down squeeze on prices associated with austerity and limited 
budgets, (2) the uncertainty associated with ever-changing rules and administrative practices, 
(3) state dominance in financing and provision, and (4) the failure by pro-market 
policymakers to depoliticise the market. Where profits are realised, it is due to (5) reduced 
costs and (6) increased volumes. These latter two conditions reinforce the status of 
incumbents, which counters marketisation by reinforcing barriers to entry.  
 
Marketisation and privatisation in English healthcare 
Marketisation is, as we define it, a change in transactions, through the introduction or 
intensification of price-based competition. This can take place through an increase in the 
standardisation of the good or service being exchanged, the frequency of exchange, the 
openness of the market to new providers, and/or the transparency and importance of the price 
mechanism (Anonymous, 2013b). Privatisation, by contrast, is a change in ownership in 
which non-state actors become increasingly involved in provision, usually through a transfer 
of assets (e.g. the sale of a hospital) or an increase in work contracted out (Peedell, 2011).  
We exclude from our definition ‘hybrid’ organisations like Foundation Trusts because they 
remain part of the state (Davies, 2013), and refer mainly to for-profit providers, because the 
market share of non-profits is low in English healthcare (CMA, 2014). While the opening of 
the market to private-sector providers is an important aspect of healthcare marketisation, 
intense price-based competition and an expanding non-state sector do not always go together. 
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The NHS has used market logic, including price mechanisms and competition, since 
purchasing was separated from provision under the ‘internal market’ of the early 1990s 
(Light, 2001). The internal market, however, was accompanied by directives limiting 
purchasing and borrowing by Trusts (Propper and Bartlett, 1997), and it was plagued by 
geographic monopolies, healthcare workers’ persistent professional ethos, public pressure 
against destabilising traditional providers, and tensions between managers and politicians 
(West, 1997).  
Governments have also attempted to stimulate competition by creating private-sector 
entry points: the 1983 mandate of competitive tendering for ancillary services (Klein, 2006), 
the 2002 introduction of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) in secondary care 
(Bishop and Waring, 2011), and the 2003 abolition of GPs’ monopoly for out-of-hours 
service in primary care (Pollock et al., 2007). Despite these opportunities, however, private 
providers still account for a small share of NHS commissioning: in 2011/2012, PCTs spent 
£5.22bn on for-profit providers, 12.3% of their total secondary care budget (Arora et al., 
2013). Why is this? In the ISTC programme, negative media reports, pressure from 
campaigners, hostility from NHS staff, and the unwillingness of some Trusts and Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) to send patients to ISTCs led to a reduction in contracts in the second 
wave from 24 to 10 (Gabbay et al., 2011). Despite their high visibility, ISTCs were limited to 
1.8% of elective care in 2007/2008 (Bishop and Waring, 2011).  
Private-sector providers depend heavily on NHS commissioning, because it is by far 
their largest potential source of income (Figure 1). In 2011 the government accounted for 
82.7% of health spending (WHO, 2014), and of the overall £108bn NHS budget (HM 
Treasury, 2013), £64.7bn are allocated to CCGs, £30bn comprise the budget of NHS 
England, and £0.9bn are distributed to local authorities for the provision of selected public 
health services (NHS England, 2014). The private medical insurance market, by contrast, 
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covered 10.9% of households in 2012, a decline of 1.6% since 2006; corporate schemes 
comprise 80% of this market (Arora et al., 2013). In one large survey only 6.9% of 
respondents reported intending to exit the NHS for private healthcare (Dowding and John, 
2011) and in another only 3% of British respondents reported spending above 1000 US$ in 
2013 (Schoen et al., 2013).  
Figure 1. Healthcare spending in the UK 
 
With 9.3% of GDP spent on health (compared to the USA’s 17.9% [WHO, 2014]), 
the NHS is adept at containing costs; this is visible in commissioning practices and in-house 
management. Around £29bn of services are commissioned using ‘Payment by Results’, a 
pricing system for particular diagnoses also known as ‘the tariff’, introduced in 2003/2004 
(Department of Health, 2012). Since 2006 these reimbursement rates have incorporated 
annual efficiencies of 3%. Furthermore, for nonmedical NHS staff, the Coalition Government 
has restricted pay increases to 1% (Office of Manpower Economics, 2013) and reduced 
capacity. Examples of the latter include the restructuring of four Accident & Emergency 
Departments into Urgent Care Centres (NHS North West London, 2013) and the closure of 
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53 Walk-In Centres between 2010 and 2013 (Butler, 2013).  The aim is to achieve £20bn of 
savings by 2015 (HM Treasury, 2013), 18.5% of the NHS’s £108bn budget. This squeeze is 
intensified by even deeper cuts to local authority budgets – 30% from 2010 to 2014 – which 
could undermine the social determinants of health, thereby increasing demand for services.  
The government’s main lever for opening the market to the private sector has been 
commissioning. While commissioning had previously been carried out by 151 Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) and 10 Strategic Health Authorities, the Act changed it to 212 Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and NHS England. CCGs are dominated by GPs, but also 
include lay members, hospital doctors, and nurses; they purchase clinical services for a 
geographically defined population of patients. NHS England commissions primary care 
services and specialist services such as screening. The regulatory infrastructure includes (in 
addition to the Department of Health) the ‘Health and Wellbeing Boards’ advising CCGs; 
‘Monitor’ regulating Trusts, enforcing competition, and setting the tariff; the ‘Care Quality 
Commission’ regulating quality; and ‘Public Health England’, which shares the public health 
function with local authorities. Marketisation is thus underpinned by complex and fragmented 
administration and regulation. 
The Act has other important marketising elements. One is Section 75, which mandates 
open and competitive tendering for services commissioned by CCGs. However, it also allows 
contract renewals with existing providers after competitive tendering if patient benefits and 
the transparency of the process can be demonstrated, and allows the NHS to litigate against 
uncompetitive contract awards to private providers (Davies, 2013). Other provisions pertain 
to the internal management of Trusts. The Act establishes a ‘failure regime’, under which 
hospitals with financial troubles can be put under special administration and plans to 
reconfigure the local health economy drawn up and implemented. The Act also universalises 
Foundation Trust status, which increases management autonomy by, among other things, 
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allowing private patient income to increase to 49% and allowing the retention and 
reinvestment of surpluses. 
While marketisation and privatisation form the core of the Act’s logic, the practical 
consequences are uncertain. While one report showed around 70% of contract awards from 
April to December 2013 awarded to non-NHS providers (NHS Support Federation, 2013), the 
volume of the work represented and the degree of change this represents is unclear. While 
policymakers have identified the contracting out of certain activities, such as pathology, as a 
major cost-saving opportunity for the NHS (Coles, 2008), it is unclear how widespread such 
exit options are. The Act increases management autonomy within Trusts, which could make 
public-sector market incumbents more competitive, reinforcing barriers to entry. Finally, the 
commissioning and regulatory infrastructure created by the act is fragmented, and CCG 
members may see themselves as more accountable to the public than to market-making 
regulators (Checkland et al., 2013). The Act’s effect on the behaviour and perceptions of 
commissioners and providers is thus unclear. 
Absent from the empirical NHS literature is the issue of profit-making, i.e. the 
realisation of surpluses that can be reinvested or distributed to owners. This latter gap is 
surprising, not only because most large contractors are for-profit and therefore need profits to 
justify investments, but also because profit-making may exacerbate health inequalities 
(Scambler, 2009), drive up costs (Hellander et al 2013), and lead hospitals to specialise in 
lucrative treatments (Horwitz, 2005).   
 
The conditions of profitability 
To generate our framework we draw on institutional political economy, economic sociology, 
and the international health policy literature. These literatures suggest several reasons why 
privatisation presupposes profit-making, but why not all forms marketisation lead to 
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profitability. Profit-making may increase incrementally through the prospect of appropriating 
small proportions of resources in a given health system (Jensen, 2011), but not necessarily 
take the form of a large-scale long-term appropriation of resources by the private sector. 
Since total expenditure equals total provider incomes, “more expenditure always yields an 
increase in income” (Evans, 1997, 443); less expenditure leads to intensified competition 
over available resources and, hence, reduced likelihood of profit-making (Keegan et al., 
2013). Entry points for private providers do not automatically produce an increase in profit-
making, since profitability depends on specific conditions. What are they? 
First, the availability of resources to private providers is important and may be 
constrained by the politics of austerity. Arguably austerity is conducive to privatisation, since 
it creates gaps in provision or investment backlogs that are then compensated through private 
means. In the Norwegian NHS in the 1990s, for example, high county revenues were 
associated with higher demand for public provision whereas low county revenues increased 
privatisation (Midttun and Hagen, 2006); and in Germany a squeeze on investment created 
the preconditions for rapid privatisation of hospitals (Anonymous, 2013b). On the other hand, 
austerity may not necessarily be conducive to privatisation, since it reduces the overall 
amount of money available to contractors. Jane Gingrich’s (2011) concept of ‘austerity 
markets’, employed to analyse the Conservative Government’s health policies in the 1980s, 
captures this ambivalence.  
 Associated with austerity is the drive by politicians and commissioners to maximise 
value for money which can reduce profit margins. This squeeze of prices for contracted work 
is facilitated by activity-based funding in which prices are fixed in a top-down manner in 
England using data from NHS providers (and not from private providers [O’Reilly et al., 
2012]). There is evidence that the privatisation of GP services by New Labour was limited 
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due to such a top-down price squeeze by commissioners which resulted in firms “finding it 
difficult to make a profit” (Allen and Jones, 2011, 23).  
A second condition is the degree of uncertainty built into the market structure, which 
shapes the calculation of risks and potential returns. Without stability or predictability in the 
parameters of a market, private providers are less likely to enter the market (Carruthers and 
Ariovich, 2004). Stability is often ensured by regulatory and state institutions enabling 
reliable calculation (Callon and Muniesa, 2005) which permits predicting returns on 
investments regarding market entry and innovations. Conversely, a lack of calculability 
reduces incentives to invest (Fligstein, 1996) and hence, profitability. For non-profit 
organisations working in English healthcare, uncertainty in the commissioning process is a 
well-documented problem (Rees, Miller and Buckingham, 2014).  
Third, the degree of competition from the public sector is important, since for-profits 
have to match the production costs of NHS providers in order to gain market share. Public 
provision has in-built advantages in price-based competition: economies of scale and not 
needing to distribute profits (Gough, 1979). Furthermore, the traditional public-sector ethos 
in the NHS enables “delivering high quality services at a relatively low cost” (Hebson et al 
2003, 492), but which can equally be eroded by performance-related pay when workers 
transfer into for-profit organisations. Moreover, state dominance in funding means strict 
limits to for-profit firms increasing their revenue from self-payers or private insurance. 
Private providers depend on winning government contracts and have difficulty competing 
with the NHS’s extensive service portfolio, instead focussing on the limited supply of 
private-sector income, predominantly for elective treatments (CMA, 2014).  
Fourth, the political process – including the depoliticisation of controversial reforms –
matters, because it redistributes power. Market reforms tend to undermine the power of 
public service workers, but have varying effects on public-sector managers, private providers, 
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and service users; they may empower one or more of these actors, but not all of them 
(Gingrich, 2011). For example, supplier opportunism in the context of Private Finance 
Initiative contracting in the NHS leads public-sector managers to employ detailed planning 
practices (Lonsdale and Watson, 2007) and hold private-sector managers accountable to 
contract specifications (Hebson, Grimshaw and Marchington, 2003), potentially leading to a 
more difficult situation for profit-making. Moreover, commissioning in English healthcare 
has traditionally limited competition, since patient choice and cash budgets were both strictly 
limited (Sheaff et al., 2013).  
Furthermore,  the power of business interests in the political process depends on the 
importance of the issue at stake to voters and its exposure in the news media.  For issues of 
low ‘salience’ business almost always gets its way, but otherwise government can have 
difficulty merely deferring to the expertise of business (Culpepper, 2010).  Despite 
policymakers’ attempts to depoliticise reforms by drawing attention away from the core 
principles of marketisation and privatisation (Leys and Player, 2010), campaigns in England 
against privatisation are widespread and ongoing (Ruane, 2011).  
Finally, certain managerial practices constitute another condition of profitability. 
These practices can be divided into increasing revenues and reducing costs. Expected cash 
flows from demand are weighed up against costs stemming from factors like infrastructure 
investment, a need for economies of scale and retaliation from incumbent providers 
(Lethbridge, 2011). Demand itself is relative to the size of a market and its accompanying 
spending power (Dicken, 2011). Furthermore, the quality of labour regarding skills, wages, 
and unit costs has also been conceptualised as an important investment factor (ibid). The 
ISTC programme provides some indication of how profits are made in English healthcare, 
namely by lowering unit costs and driving “the standardisation of work and a performance 
regime” (Turner et al., 2011, 527). The little evidence that exists indicates non-NHS 
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providers are able to match the quality standards of NHS providers, without, however, 
providing higher quality services (Propper and Dixon, 2011) or medical innovation (Turner et 
al., 2011, 528). Moreover, Foundation Trusts are also aggressive in expanding market share 
and can make decisions quicker due to their enhanced autonomy (Allen and Jones, 2011), and 
may have become more efficient due to increased competition (Propper and Dixon, 2011). 
These studies indicate that profits are made by lowering unit costs, but that the NHS may be 
more innovative and increasingly cost-competitive.  
Our research questions concern the conditions of profitability in health-care markets. 
What are the constraints on profit-making under the 2012 Act? What are the effects of 
austerity, state dominance, uncertainty, and the political process? Where private-sector 
management does succeed in profit-making, what are its strategies?  
 
Methodology   
While most studies of the 2012 Act are based on policy and legal documents and were written 
before CCGs took up their statutory duties, ours is based on interviews conducted 6-10 
months afterwards. We chose a qualitative approach to explore profit-making and 
marketisation in health services in order to capture the perceptions and rationales 
underpinning management decisions. We focus on health services and leave aside other 
NHS-funded market segments, such as consultancy, infrastructure financing, 
pharmaceuticals, information technology, and ancillary services, which differ from health 
services in terms of task, actors, and regulation. We focus on England, leaving aside the UK’s 
three devolved countries, since the 2012 Act does not apply to them, and since marketisation 
has gone furthest in England (Greer, 2008).  
We conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with 34 participants (twice we 
interviewed two participants together). Our sample includes 15 private-sector representatives, 
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of which 10 were senior managers (in radiology, pathology, hospitals, global service 
provision and home care) and 5 were management consultants (including 4 partners). We also 
interviewed 6 public-sector representatives (including 2 from regulatory agencies, 1 finance 
manager of an FT and 1 commissioner) and 5 trade unionists (including senior officials, 
regional organisers and researchers). Additionally we spoke to 4 clinicians (2 GPs and 2 CCG 
members), 3 campaigners and 1 healthcare researcher. The private-sector participants all had 
at least 5 years’ experience working in senior management positions in profit-making 
enterprises and 10 years of experience in the private healthcare market. Additionally, several 
had extensive clinical experience, and/or experience working in the public sector, and/or 
experience abroad, in Australia or the USA. 
We chose our sample purposefully for “theory triangulation” (Patton, 1999, 1196) 
using the differing perspectives of stakeholders (private-sector managers, public-sector 
representatives, unionists and campaigners) to cross-check their various interests. Most of our 
sample comprises private-sector business development managers and managing directors. 
While this seems to give us low generalisability, the strategic decisions in this sector are 
made by a few people, mostly in senior management. By interviewing other stakeholders we 
were able to probe the same set of issues with different individuals with varying interests 
(e.g. pro-market versus anti-market and purchaser versus provider) and knowledge. The case 
study is triangulated further by the use of publicly available statistics and research reports, 
which we cite below.  
All interviewees were asked about the impact of the Act and austerity measures, the 
relevance of campaigning and unionisation for their work and their organisations. Private-
sector participants were additionally asked about their competitive advantages compared to 
the NHS and whether the Coalition Government's health policies had created better 
conditions for developing business and winning contracts. Interviews with unionists and 
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campaigners focused additionally on labour issues and the efficacy of campaigning, while 
interviews with civil servants scrutinised policy intentions and the new regulatory framework. 
The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes on average. They were recorded, 
part-transcribed and coded line-by-line and thematically with MAXQDA. The focus was on 
key segments, selected by the researchers as relevant to the main research questions. Then the 
interviews were coded by both researchers along the emergent themes of austerity policies, 
commissioning reform, profitability barriers and profit-making avenues; these themes were 
identified through memos, email exchanges, and in-person discussions. The data were 
analysed 3 times, starting with an inductive approach (both researchers exploring the 
transcripts and attaching codes in a relatively ad-hoc fashion) and ending with a top-down 
approach (one researcher more systematically coding using an agreed-upon coding scheme). 
Between iterations, the co-authors discussed differences in interpretation until they reached 
agreement and then revised the coding scheme (Campbell et al., 2013).   
Written consent was received from each participant via a consent form sent at least 
two days prior to interviewing, and University ethics approval was obtained. 
 
   
Findings 1: Perceived profitability barriers  
  
Above we introduced barriers to profitability by discussing the macro-structure of the English 
healthcare market. In the following sections we discuss four areas in which our interviewees 
found market dynamics frustrating to profit-making.  
 
Uncertainty in rules. Our interviewees were disappointed by a lack of clarity surrounding 
competitive tendering requirements. While CCGs are bound by competition law and EU 
regulations, a lack of bids does not require re-tendering if the process is transparent, “the 
providers were able equally to bid for it” (CCG GP Member), and the value of remaining 
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with incumbent providers is demonstrable. Moreover, attempts to reduce external tendering 
were reported and the ability to challenge tendering outcomes was described as limited by 
some private-sector managers, since litigation can strain the relationship with the funder. 
Our interviewees reported uncertainty in the rules of competition built into Section 
75, other issues like when VAT can be claimed back by the private sector, and the reality of 
periodic top-down NHS reorganisations. This turmoil can cause periods of revenue-losing 
inactivity: “it’s almost like the system takes a breath and stands still for a year […] everyone 
needs to find their feet, find out how the new system works” (Development Director 
Radiology 1).  
The decision-making process within the NHS was described as slow and uncertain: 
“policies change by the time somebody’s made a decision, it’s quite frustrating” (Director 
Home Care). When reorganisations incorporate personnel changes, they disrupt the flow of 
data and relationships between provider and funder: “It’s almost as if we have no track record 
as a provider, which has been really, really frustrating” (Development Director Radiology 2). 
Frequent policy changes lead to uncertainty, since services may become redundant: “there 
have been some well-documented organisations who spent a lot of money and have 
withdrawn because they’ve not seen their return on investment [due to policy changes]” 
(Director Global Service Provider 1). One service provider reported demanding a contract 
length of five years rather than the standard one year due to upfront investments. 
The lengthy and costly procurement process also contributes to uncertainty. 
Advertisement to contract award in the NHS generally takes 18-24 months, and interviewees 
report that the investment needed for participating in tenders can exceed the likely returns of 
the contract. In addition, four private-sector managers complained of losing upfront 
investment due to the NHS cancelling tenders: “it’s like playing roulette with quite big 
stakes” (Managing Director Pathology).  
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The complexity and fragmentation of regulation also contributes to uncertainty. The 
number of regulatory bodies increased from 175 to 300 (not including commissioning), and 
the Department of Health’s role in implementation was reduced by a cut in its management 
consultancy budget, which led to a multiplication of approval stages for system changes. This 
fragmentation frustrated, for example, the creation of large regional contracts with multiple 
CCGs: “The whole East of England did a big procurement around GP pathology, it took two 
years and [NHS organisations] were going to lose 10 million pounds of revenue […] though 
results were announced and [private providers] spent 10, 15 million pounds doing it, it didn’t 
go ahead” (Managing Director Pathology).   
 
 
The top-down price squeeze. Interviewees also often reported a top-down squeeze on prices 
resulting from austerity, which reduced available resources. Margins on NHS commissioning 
were described as eroding or low compared to other revenue streams: “there’s definitely 
margin erosion. The margins in the NHS are much lower than they are in our pharma or 
private business” (Development Director Home Care).  
The NHS as funder demands efficiency: “we have to work even harder, because we 
have to produce a margin and then we have to produce the gain and the efficiencies that the 
commissioner wants” (Director Global Service Provider 2). Achieving profits through NHS 
commissioning is further complicated by the importance of quality, which can lead to the 
inability to deliver services according to contract specification: “[the for-profit provider] 
could not deliver the quality for the price agreed […] we re-tendered at the end of the 
contract. They chose not to bid and in fact stopped offering that service and the contract was 
then won by a consortium of a non-local NHS provider and a local voluntary provider” (GP).  
The steady reductions in the tariff, which is calculated as an average of reported NHS 
provider costs, also squeezed resources. A recurrent theme in interviews was that poor-
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quality data submitted by NHS providers drove down reported average costs, sometimes 
below market rates. In one extreme case, Trust delivery costs for PET-CT scans were 
reported at between £99 and £1300, despite necessary isotopes costing £100. 
 
State dominance of funding and provision. The third profitability barrier reported is the 
dominance of the state. Participants complained that the market had not really opened, and 
six interviewees described it as ‘immature’, despite marketisation and privatisation trends 
since the 1980s. They pointed to a lack of funding beyond NHS commissioning due to low 
private medical insurance coverage and the scarcity of patients paying out-of-pocket. Private 
insurance is only offered as a high-cost, elective product which does not cover a broad range 
of healthcare services, most notably emergency services. Executives at multinationals pointed 
to countries with private medical insurance as more lucrative markets.  
The nature of CCGs is one source of private-sector disappointment. Decision-making 
processes were described as more formal and difficult to influence after the Act. Moreover, 
CCGs tend to structure provision in detail rather than letting providers decide how to comply 
with contract specifications. Contracts were also often small due to the decentralised nature 
of CCGs, and providers reported frustration in their attempts to create larger contracts with 
longer running times. Interviewees reported contracts as often too small-scale to attain returns 
on investments.  
Our private-sector interviewees characterised CCGs as uninterested in stimulating 
privatisation. CCGs have “gone straight back to how it used to be” (Director Hospitals 1) 
with strong links to incumbent NHS providers. Equally, they were deterred by the possibility 
that, by switching to private providers, “you could destabilise a whole organisation” (CCG 
Lay Member). A further limitation was that commissioning expertise was lost in the 
transition to CCGs and that the remaining members were “much more about keeping the 
system going” (GP). Moreover, GP interviewees were not interested in stimulating 
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privatisation, and one private-sector interviewee argued that many CCG members “didn’t 
become GPs to manage a budget” (Consultancy Partner 2). 
In addition, because of the range of high-quality services provided by the NHS and its 
ability to cross-subsidise, private sector interviewees reported difficulty competing with the 
NHS for certain treatments: “I think there are services that have to be provided by the NHS 
[…] There’s specialist things that a private company will never do, it would be too expensive 
or too specialist” (Pathology Management Consultant). Additionally, the NHS was 
characterised as “best in terms of value for money […] no other system provides as 
comprehensive a coverage at such high quality” (Consultancy Partner 1). 
Internal public-sector restructuring posed an additional challenge to the private sector, 
because – together with public-sector management autonomy under Foundation Trust status – 
it intensified the NHS’s cost advantages. Due to pressures on terms and conditions, increased 
workloads, and downbanding, NHS workers felt “the restrain of resources, trying to stretch 
over those gaps by working an exhaustive number of unpaid overtime [but] there’s 
downgrading, removing their clinical worth” (Senior Union Official). Moreover, Foundation 
Trusts could establish new businesses to circumvent collectively bargained work hours and 
pay grades: “we’ve got through subsidiary companies out of Agenda for Change” (FT 
Finance Manager). Several had also established gateway clinics in the Middle East to funnel 
private patients to the UK. 
The reliance on NHS commissioning restricted the private sector’s viable revenue 
streams and hence its service portfolio. Our interviewees interpreted this as a lack of much-
needed government support, which, one argued, “does not happen without being forced” 
(Director Hospitals 2).   
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Failed depoliticisation. The last barrier is the inability of for-profit providers and pro-market 
policymakers to de-politicise the market. Because of the high value placed on the NHS by the 
British public, privatising healthcare is a risky proposition for politicians: “the NHS is 
probably the one area of public sector that’s absolutely sacrosanct” (Consultancy Partner 2). 
Consequently, prior to the passage of the Act, the Government denied, disingenuously, that 
privatisation was intended (Peedell, 2011). 
The NHS employment relations system contributes to politicisation, due to high union 
density, collective bargaining coverage (Brownlie, 2012), and the high degree of 
professionalisation. Campaigning groups such as Save Our NHS and Keep Our NHS Public 
draw attention to privatisation and private-sector service failures. As a result several private-
sector interviewees bemoaned the orientation of staff towards professional autonomy and the 
public interest rather than performance as defined by management. 
Negative media reports were also named as difficulties in growing business. The 
media was seen as reporting sensational stories of service failures and negative patient 
experiences: “They [the media] love it when we get it wrong, they’re not remotely interested 
when we get it right, at least that’s not where the national mood is” (Development Director 
Radiology 2). Negative media reports could damage brand value and a company’s reputation: 
“those levels of scrutiny create newspaper headlines and stories […] of concern to boards” 
(Director Global Service Provider 1).  
 Campaigning was generally seen as anti-privatisation and almost successful in 
stopping the enactment of the Health and Social Care Bill 2011. A top-down reorganisation 
by the Coalition Government had not been expected, as party manifestos explicitly rejected 
this. Enactment was therefore described as “one of the most aggressive, quick policy, rushing 
through things that have not been scrutinised” (Researcher and Unionist) causing resentment 
and disappointment. Moreover, campaigning was fuelled by the impact of austerity and 
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reconfigurations: “it’s very easy for the public to imagine what’s going to happen when 
someone says: ‘We’re going to close your local hospital’, they’ve got an immediate 
emotional attachment, often members of their family were born or died within that hospital” 
(Researcher and Activist 1).  
 The degree of politicisation varied according to the type of service provided, with 
highly visible services attracting attention from patients, staff and the public. Clinical services 
and services directly involving patients are highly visible, triggering demonstrations, with the 
University Hospital Lewisham – the first time the Act’s “failure regime” was triggered, 
which could have led to privatisation – being an extreme case: “South-East London, they 
hadn’t had a protest like the Lewisham Hospital for years and years and years, 25,000 people 
to defend one hospital in one borough” (Researcher and Activist 2). Where the private sector 
was established, services tended to be less visible and more removed from public scrutiny. 
Community health services, for example, were seen as opaque because they dealt with 
marginalised social groups, and pathology worked “behind the scenes” (Pathology 
Management Consultant). 
Our interviewees reported attempts to avert attention by employing little public 
relations activity: “We take a marketing-by-stealth type approach [and] tend to just quietly 
grow our business” (Director Home Care). In areas of trade-union strength, managers 
reported in addition consulting with worker representatives to avoid resistance: “One of the 
key things that has happened in all the projects across the country I’ve seen is that the unions 
have always been involved at a very early stage, always been consulted and part of the main 
decisions” (Pathology Management Consultant). 
  
Findings 2: Profit-making in particular segments 
  
While the system restricts profit-making, segments do exist where profits are realised. The 
privatisation of the community health services sector, for example, started in the 1980s, and 
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by 2000, 69% of spending was on private services (Player and Pollock, 2001). Radiology, 
pathology and mental health were also named by interviewees as profitable, and some 
reported an increase in tendering activity (for one home care provider the number of tenders 
in play had doubled in 2013) or contract size, as well as attempts in the hospital segment to 
profit from increased waiting times by serving self-payers seeking to jump the queue. The 
NHS’s reduced investment capacity was also described as a private-sector opportunity in 
some market segments, since it prompted Trusts to consider outsourcing. The bulk of the 
work reported, however, was repeat business by incumbents. In these cases there were two 
main avenues for profit-making: cost reduction through performance management, process 
optimisation, greater asset utilisation and reduced personnel costs; and achieving high and 
stable volumes.  
  
Reducing costs. Efficiencies are gained partly through managing staff differently from the 
NHS. Low pay in the NHS is compensated with a high degree of professional autonomy, 
which reinforces a public-sector ethos and upholds quality standards (Hyde et al., 2009). 
Private providers depart from this formula through the avoidance of collective bargaining and 
tight performance management. 
Lower personnel costs result, first, from employing lower-skilled workers. In 
pathology, “a lot of band 6s and 7s manage the equipment [in the NHS]. You go to Europe or 
any of the new labs in the UK, you see band 3s and 4s” (Pathology Management Consultant). 
Deskilling is complemented by increased patient turnover achieved using lean management 
techniques. Lower levels of unionisation and collective bargaining coverage are crucial, since 
the Agenda for Change stipulates increased pay during unsocial hours. This advantage is 
mitigated in cases where contractors employ former NHS staff under transfer of undertakings 
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(TUPE) rules that protect their terms and conditions of employment. Contractors facing these 
requirements face increased production costs, according to one director, of 12%. 
At the same time work is tightly managed using IT. This includes monitoring: “we’ve 
got complete visibility about what [nurses] do, when they do it, how long it takes” (Director 
Home Care). Control is facilitated by standardisation. Executives argue that performance 
management of staff is a central part of strategy: “we can take the established infrastructure 
and personnel and deliver more quickly best practice [and eliminate] poor performance” 
(Director Global Service Provider 2). 
A final technique for reducing unit costs is intensive asset utilisation. In radiology, for 
example, private-sector interviewees reported a higher rate of average scans than the NHS, 
sometimes almost double the amount. Because of working-time rules the NHS cannot 
continually utilise its assets, instead sometimes using a machine worth £1.5m only 4-5 hours 
per day (FT Finance Manager).  
 
 
Increasing volumes. Attaining large volumes in particular segments is the other avenue for 
profit-making. Before achieving a high volume of business, a private healthcare company is 
usually loss-making until it attains a high enough market share to generate sufficient returns 
to be profitable. Obtaining large volumes is also important for gaining access to capital and 
reducing purchasing costs, especially in technology-driven areas such as hospitals and 
radiology, where austerity policies limit the NHS’ ability to borrow.  
Large scale can be achieved in various ways. One is specialisation in one area and 
provision across a large geography: “So what they’ve now marketed is ‘We can do your 
specialist tests’ [...] so what’s actually happening is we’re getting an enormous volume of 
bloody work” (Trade Unionist and Clinical Specialist). Another path to scale is the 
diversification of services – with some companies coming from outside the health sector – 
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such that low-paying treatments are cross-subsidised by more lucrative ones (Development 
Director Radiology 2).  
Incumbent status was needed, according to our interviewees, to attain these high 
volumes. The NHS’s fragmentation made it difficult for new market entrants to build 
relationships: “We’ve seen a lot of people mostly from across the Atlantic who’ve tried to 
break in [the English market] and I think why we’re successful is because the vast majority of 
us, in particular senior positions, have been in the NHS, so understand it, can talk the 
language (Director Global Service Provider 2). Furthermore, incumbents could point to past 
success, which mitigated difficulties in demonstrating quality. Conversely, interviewees 
reported first-mover disadvantages due to high investment costs and lacking experience, track 
record, and relationships with the funder (NHS England Commissioner). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper examines government efforts to increase privatisation in English healthcare 
through marketisation. By relating the market structure to general conditions of profitability 
we identify the barriers to profit-making and management strategies to mitigate them (see 
Table 1). Our assessment of the for-profit sector should be considered preliminary, and 
understanding the effects of marketisation on Trusts and non-profit providers is a matter for 
future research. However, much of what we find may persist due to the well-known path 
dependency of health systems (Wilsford, 1994), and our findings may resonate in other 
countries with NHS-style health systems (Böhm et al., 2013). 
 
 
Table 1. The conditions of profitability in the English healthcare market 
Dimension General characteristics English healthcare 
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Barrier: Uncertainty in rules Market rules                                                                      
Policy changes and reorganisation 
Procurement practice 
Contract length 
Lack of clarity over section 75 
Restructuring every 2 years  
Lengthy, costly, and risky tendering exercises 
1 year, often too short for return on investments 
Barrier: Top-down price 
squeeze  
Impact of austerity measures                
Private health insurance 
Self-payers 
Squeeze on prices, limited public investment 
Limited funding for elective procedures 
Growing but marginal source of funding 
Barrier: State dominance in 
funding and provision 
State dominance in funding 
Quality and efficiency of public-
sector provision 
Public-sector economies of scale                              
Public-sector employment relations 
Providers depend on NHS commissioning 
Funder reluctant to switch to private provision 
 
Increasingly autonomous and competitive Trusts 
Pay restraint, public-sector ethos 
Barrier: Failed depoliticisation  Central government role 
Anti-privatisation campaigns 
Trade unions 
Media attention 
Strong central government intervention 
Strong local and national campaigning 
High union membership and campaigning 
High degree of critical media attention 
Management practices: 
reducing costs 
Unionisation 
 
Skill levels 
Performance Management 
 
Asset Utilisation 
Lower union density and collective bargaining 
coverage than NHS 
Downbanding, i.e. deskilling 
Tighter monitoring facilitated by IT systems and 
standardisation  
Higher patient turnover and longer running 
times of machines 
Management practices: 
increasing volumes  
Access to capital 
 
Economies of scale 
 
Incumbent status 
Private financing facilitated by investment 
shortages in the NHS 
Specialisation across large geography or 
diversification of services 
Advantages of big players through existing 
relationships with NHS  
 
For our private-sector interviewees, profits were difficult to realise partly because of 
austerity and the extraction of price concessions through efficiencies built into the tariff and 
through competitive tendering exercises that pit the private sector against low-cost and high-
quality NHS providers. On the other hand, especially in technology-driven segments like 
radiology and pathology, austerity could also lead to investment backlogs in the NHS. The 
private sector’s access to capital was seen as creating opportunities to take over these 
services. Austerity thus had an ambivalent effect on profit-making.  
Barriers to profitability identified by interviewees included the uncertainty built into 
the rules of this market, the dominance of the NHS as both funder and competitor, and by the 
high degree of public attention and staff resistance directed at privatisation attempts. For-
profits reported difficulty competing on the basis of price and quality with the NHS, and the 
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complex relationship between politics and commissioning necessitated strategies by for-
profits to avoid resistance from campaigners. Active profit-making strategies, according to 
our interviewees, consisted of cost-cutting and economies of scale, rather than qualitative 
innovation in care. This latter finding is striking, since innovation is one of the supposed 
reasons for marketisation and privatisation policies.  
This study contributes to the international health policy literature by identifying 
profit-making as a precondition for privatisation in marketising healthcare systems and by 
generating a framework for understanding the conditions of profitability. While past studies 
have tended to assume that marketisation leads to privatisation, our framework helps to 
explain the limited extent of healthcare privatisation under marketisation in England. It opens 
the door to a more nuanced understanding of marketisation by identifying various dimensions 
of it that may promote or frustrate privatisation.  
Our analysis implies that under the current framework private expansion in England 
will be concentrated at a few big players in the market segments with a previous history of 
privatisation and not as an encompassing takeover of healthcare. Achieving economies of 
scale is all the more necessary for these firms, since guaranteed payment above market rates, 
as in the early ISTC programme, is not practised anymore. Since this requires incumbent 
status, profit-making strategies may be reinforcing entry barriers, thus thwarting the 
Government’s efforts to promote competition.  
A final implication of our analysis is that the agency of workers and citizens matters 
in marketisation and is a major asset for the NHS. Campaigners have mounted a vigorous 
defence of the NHS, its workers, and its principles, and have kept health policy highly 
politicised. Private-sector managers argued that these political dynamics make investors 
wary, thereby inhibiting privatisation. Although campaigners may lack a strong voice in NHS 
reform, they have made the NHS a remarkably resilient public institution. 
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